Showing posts with label civil law. Show all posts
Showing posts with label civil law. Show all posts

Monday, December 14, 2009

The Superiority of private Land Ownership Rights

Under English law, the recognition of ownership must always include the ability to inherit. That recognition being accepted by English law as fee simple ownership.

Civil law can recognise Fee Simple BUT it is enshrined in an extremely tight constitution where it can not be interfered with.

The problem that our Australian Federal & State legislatures have is that statute law can not guarantee rights because the statute can changed or even repealed. In civil law countries (France, Germany etc) these rights are enshrined in their very tight constitutions. In common law countries these rights are enshrined in the common law itself although it must be said that civil law countries have elements of common law as well, and vice versa. However, in Australia they are progressively extinguishing the common law and replacing it with civil law without any enshrined constitutional mechanism that protect the rights lost by the removal of the common law. Single or multiple statutes can not accommodate those rights because they can be removed or altered at the whim of the parliament or "Polite Bureau".

With regards to land ownership those rights are tied up in an "Inheritable Estate" which in this country can only be Fee Simple. Lease hold titles are not inheritable because they are titles by virtue of a "Statute" and that statute can be altered or repealed therefore there is no security of inheritance.

Therefore if the legislature removes the "Inheritance" or can not guarantee the inheritance of a "title of inheritance" that once existed, but by virtue of a statute has been removed and IN DOING SO also imposes a penalty (for destroying ones inheritance and therefore private property) therein lies an "ABSOLUTE TAKING". The "Penalty" and criminal prosecution means that you have destroyed "Their Property" NOT YOURS therefore the inheritance has transferred to the Government and the "Public".


MABO and ANOTHER v. THE STATE OF QUEENSLAND and ANOTHER [1988] HCA 69; (1989) 166 CLR 186 F.C. 88/062 (8 December 1988)

Deane:

23. The question therefore arises whether the practical effect of the Act would, upon the assumption made for the purposes of the demurrer, be to produce a situation where the Torres Strait Islanders or the Miriam people(being "persons of a particular race, colour or national or ethnic origin") "do not enjoy a right that is enjoyed by persons of another race, colour or national or ethnic origin, or enjoy a right to a more limited extent than" such other persons within the meaning of those words as used in s.10 of the Commonwealth Act. In the light of what has been said above, the answer to that question must, in my view, be in the affirmative.

The practical operation and effect of the Act, even on the correct and more confined construction of s.3, are to single out the Torres Strait Islanders (including the Miriam people) for discriminatory treatment in relation to traditional proprietary rights and interests to and in their homelands. The confiscation or extinction of such rights and interests without any compensation or any procedure for ascertaining or assessing the existence and extent of the claims of particular individuals is a denial of the entitlements to ownership and inheritance of property, including the implicit immunity from arbitrary dispossession, which are "rights" for the purposes of s.10(1) of the Commonwealth Act.

That denial of rights is confined to the Torres Strait Islanders. It does not extend to persons of "another race, colour or national or ethnic origin". Its effect is that the Torres Strait Islanders, including the Miriam people, are denied ("do not enjoy") "rights", including the entitlement to immunity from being arbitrarily dispossessed, which are enjoyed by those other persons. That being so, that denial attracts the protective provisions of s.10(1) of the Commonwealth Act. In the context of the provisions of s.10(3), it would be anomolous if it were otherwise.

Mabo (2)

Deane and Gaudron:

69. The detailed findings of Moynihan J. of the Supreme Court of Queensland in relation to the issues of fact remitted to that court unavoidably contain areas of uncertainty and elements of speculation. Nonetheless, they provide, for present purposes, a sound basis for some generalizations in relation to native entitlements to the occupation and use of land within the Murray Islands under local law or custom at the time of their annexation to Queensland. It suffices, for the purposes of this judgment, to say that the Meriam people lived in an organized community which recognized individual and family rights of possession, occupation and exploitation of identified areas of land.

The entitlement to occupation and use of land differed from what has come to be recognized as the ordinary position in settled British Colonies in that, under the traditional law or custom of the Murray Islanders, there was a consistent focus upon the entitlement of the individual or family as distinct from the community as a whole or some larger section of it. It would seem that, with the exception of the area used by the London Missionary Society, those individual or familial entitlements under traditional law or custom extended to all the land of the Islands. It is true, as the learned Solicitor-General for Queensland submitted, that it is impossible to identify any precise system of title, any precise rules of inheritance or any precise methods of alienation. Nonetheless, there was undoubtedly a local native system under which the established familial or individual rights of occupation and use were of a kind which far exceed the minimum requirements necessary to found a presumptive common law native title. In circumstances where the strong assumption of the common law was unaffected by the act of State annexing the Islands, the effect of the annexation was that the traditional entitlements of the Meriam people were preserved. The radical title to all the lands of the Islands vested in the Crown.

The Crown's proprietary estate in the land was, however, reduced, qualified or burdened by the common law native title of the Islanders which was thereafter recognized and protected by the law of ueensland. It is unnecessary to determine whether the lands of the Islands became, upon annexation, Crown lands for the purposes of the Crown Lands Alienation Act. If they did, the common law native title of the Islanders was not extinguished but remained a burden on the underlying title of the Crown, and any provisions of that Act which would have the effect of modifying the common law native title or restricting the rights of use and occupation of the Islanders were, to that extent, inapplicable.


Newcrest Mining (WA) Limited v The Commonwealth of Australia [1997] [HCA]

One highly influential international statement on the understanding of universal and fundamental rights is the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. That document is not a treaty to which Australia is a party. Indeed it is not a treaty at all. It is not part of Australia's domestic law, still less of its Constitution[479]. Nevertheless, it may in this country, as it has in other countries, influence legal development and constitutional interpretation[480]. At least it may do so where its terms do not conflict with, but are consistent with, a provision of the Constitution[481].

The use of international law in such a way has been specifically sanctioned by the Privy Council when giving meaning to express constitutional provisions relating to "fundamental rights and freedoms"[482]. Such jurisprudence has its analogies in the courts of several other countries[483]. The growing influence of the Universal Declaration upon the jurisprudence in the International Court of Justice may also be noted[484].

The Universal Declaration states in Article 17:

"1. Everyone has the right to own property alone as well as in association with others.

2. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property."

Whilst this article contains propositions which are unremarkable to those familiar with the Australian legal system, the prohibition on the arbitrary deprivation of property expresses an essential idea which is both basic and virtually uniform in civilized legal systems. Historically, its roots may be traced as far back as the Magna Carta 1215, Art 52 of which provided:

"To any man whom we have deprived or dispossed of lands, castles, liberties or rights, without the lawful judgment of his equals, we will at once restore these".

A more specific documentary embodiment of the notion may be found in Article 17 of the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, 1789[485]:

"Property, being an inviolable and sacred right, none can be deprived of it, except when public necessity, legally ascertained, evidently requires it, and on condition of a just and prior indemnity".

Like protections against arbitrary and uncompensated deprivation of property may be found in the constitutions of most civilized countries. In the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution it is provided that[486]:

"No person shall be ... deprived of ... property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation."

The original provision to this effect in the Indian Constitution[487] has been amended several times [488]. The provision required that no person should be deprived of that person's property save by authority of law and such law had to provide for compensation for the property so acquired or requisitioned[489]. The Supreme Court of India, while that test stood, insisted that provisions for compensation were a necessary condition for the making of a valid law providing for the acquisition or requisition of property by the state [490]. In other countries of the region property rights are constitutionally protected by the same two requirements. Thus, Malaysia's Constitution provides that there shall be no deprivation of property save in accordance with law and no valid law for compulsory acquisition or use of property without adequate compensation[491]. Similarly the Japanese Consititution provides[492] that "[p]rivate [p]roperty may be taken for public use upon just compensation". In South Africa, where the issue was much debated in the context of the rights of the dispossessed majority, the 1996 Bill of Rights provides that "[n]o-one may be deprived of property except in terms of a law of general application, and no law may permit arbitrary deprivation of property"[493].

In effect, the foregoing constitutional provisions do no more than reflect universal and fundamental rights by now recognised by customary international law. Ordinarily, in a civilised society, where private property rights are protected by law, the government, its agencies or those acting under authority of law may not deprive a person of such rights without a legal process which includes provision for just compensation. Whilst companies such as the appellants may not, as such, be entitled to the benefit of every fundamental human right[494], s 51(xxxi) of the Australian Constitution must be understood as it commonly applies to individuals entitled to the protection of basic rights. It must be given a meaning and operation which fully reflects that application. In this way, in Australian law, it extends to protect the basic rights of corporations as well as individuals.

When the foregoing principles, of virtually universal application, are remembered, it becomes even more astonishing to suggest that the Australian Constitution, which in 1901 expressly and exceptionally recognised and gave effect to the applicable universal principle, should be construed today in such a way as to limit the operation of that express requirement in respect of some laws made by its Federal Parliament but not others. Where there is an ambiguity in the meaning of the Constitution, as there is here, it should be resolved in favour of upholding such fundamental and universal rights[495]. The Australian Constitution should not be interpreted so as to condone an unnecessary withdrawal of the protection of such rights. At least it should not be so interpreted unless the text is intractable and the deprivation of such rights is completely clear. Neither of these conditions applies here. Nor should arbitrary deprivation of property be lightly attributed to a constitution, such as the Australian Constitution, given the history of its origins and its purpose. That purpose is to be the basic law for the government of a free people in a nation which relates to the rest of the world in a context in which the growing influence of international law is of ever increasing importance.

The authority of Teori Tau apart, a correct understanding of the Constitution does not oblige a construction condoning a law made by the Federal Parliament for a territory providing for the acquisition of property otherwise than on just terms. The obstacle which Teori Tau presents to the adoption of the correct constitutional principle should be overcome. This may the more readily be done because that decision effectively breaks a promise given on behalf of the Commonwealth at federation adopting a safeguard, restriction or qualification on its lawmaking powers relevant to the fundamental rights of all persons from whom property is compulsorily acquired under federal law. That promise extends to the territories and to laws for the government of the territories. This Court should ensure that the promise is kept. The decision in Teori Tau should be overruled. Section 51 (xxxi) applies to a law made by the Federal Parliament under s 122. It therefore applies to the Conservation Act. It follows that the orders and declarations proposed by Gummow J should be made.

Pt 4. The QLD Constitution 2001 & the Removal of all Ownership Rights in QLD

Judicial Results

Because this new Constitution was presented to and passed b the Parliament of Qld without respect of reference to the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act section 106, to the Queensland Constitution Act 1867 and without a referendum of the People as cited at section 53, this removed the Separation of Powers and recreated QLD as an independent, sovereign, corporation government outside of and not, therefore, subject to the laws of the Commonwealth or other States & Territories, in contradiction of the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act.

The Common Law has been repealed from the Supreme Court Act 1995 (Q), Reprint No. 2, reprinted as in force 2 March 2001 © State of Q 2001, by the omission of Part 9 – Division Heading 4 Common Law & Jurisdiction; Division Heading 5 Equitable Jurisdiction; Division Heading 6 Criminal Jurisdiction - Section 199 Laws of England to be applied in the administration of Justice; Section 200 Common Law and General Jurisdiction of the Court, Jurisdiction at common Law; Section 2001 Equitable Jurisdiction; Section 202 Criminal Jurisdiction.

Courtesy of the Constitution of Queensland 2001 Chapter 4 – Courts – section 58 – Supreme Courts – the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction is now of the State.

QLD is now outside the Commonwealth of Australia as an independent sovereign
State without common law, and the people are subject to civil and statute law only. The
'common law and general jurisdiction'; the 'Laws of England to be applied in the
administration of justice' and 'equitable jurisdiction' have been removed under the Supreme
Court Act 1995(Qld) Reprint number 2A dated 2nd March, 2001 under Schedule 2 of the
Constitution of Queensland 2001.

All private equity and inheritance in the State is the property of “the State”, see Corporations (Q) Act 1990 (Q), Reprint No 3, reprinted as in force immediately before 15 July 2001 ©State of Q 2006. All courts, including the Magistrates Courts, are inside the Parliament of QLD.

The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of QLD is found in the Constitution of
Queensland 2001, Part 5 - Powers of the State. Therefore it is assumed that the Judges of the Supreme and District Courts of QLD must protect the 'assets' of the State of QLD and find only in favour of the State, not in favour of the registered ownersof private land who have lost, under the statute laws of QLD, the rights to use their fee simple land as they see fit.

The Constitution of Queensland 2001 Chapter 3, Sections 51 & 27 are ultra vires to the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act at s109, s106, s107, s51 & s52 of the Referendum (Machinery Provisions) Act 1984 (C’wth). Ultra vires meaning Without authority. An act which is beyond the powers or authority of the person or organization which took it.

The common law and references to the Crown have been removed out of the Supreme Court Act 1995(Qld).

Civil law and statute law have a very different requirement for the committing of any offence, whether an indictable offence, a summary offence, a simple offence or an absolute offence such as a traffic offence where a guilty mind is not required to commit that offence.

Under the civil law system, which is now subject to the Uniform Civil Procedures Rules of the Supreme Court Act 1991(Qld), every person is guilty until they prove their innocence.

The Supreme and District Court, other courts and the Judges and Justices of those Courts are now inside the corporation of the Government, and not sworn representatives of the Crown. Under the Constitution of Queensland 2001, all documents are issued or signed under the Public Seal of the State. This would be any document appointing a politician, a Judge or any person who should swear an oath of allegiance to the Sovereign. The Governor now seals that document in accordance with the Constitution of Queensland 2001 section 37 with the Public Seal of the State therefore voiding the appointment of any of those people by the Sovereign but making those people in effect 'officers of the State' and subject to the 'Powers of the State' as cited in Part 5 of the Constitution of Queensland 2001.

Monday, December 7, 2009

Colour of Law v Black Letter Law

Black Letter Law
The black letter law refers to the basic standard elements for a particular field of law, which are generally known and free from doubt or dispute.

The phrase definitely refers to a distillation of the common law into general and accepted legal principles and is used commonly in the Australian legal system to mean well-established case law.

In common law, black letter legal doctrine is an informal term indicating the basic principles of law generally accepted by the courts and/or embodied in the statutes of a particular jurisdiciton.

Letter of the law is its actual implementation, thereby demonstrating that black letter law are those statutes, rules, acts, laws, provisions, etc. that are or have been written down, codified, or indicated somewhere in legal texts throughout history of specific state law.

This is often the case for many precedents that have been set in the common law. An example of such a state within the common law jurisdiction, and using the black letter legal doctrine is Canada. Being a monarchical state, with its roots invested in Colonial England, black letter law is that which is a term used to describe basic principles of law that are accepted by the majority of judges in most provinces and territories.

Contract, tort and land law are typical black letter law subjects, whereas administrative law, example, would be considered considerably less black letter.

Colour of Law
Color of is a legal term meaning "pretense or appearance of" some right; in other words, 'color of', as in 'color of law', means the thing colors (or adjusts) the law; however the adjustment made may either be lawful or it may merely appear to be lawful.

Color of law refers to an appearance of legal power to act but which may actually operate in violation of law. For example, though a police officer acts with the color of law authority to arrest someone, if such an arrest is made without probably cause the arrest may actually be in violation of law. In other words, just because something is done with the 'color of law', that does not mean that the action was actually lawful.

Civil Law

What is it?
Civil law is a legal system inspired by Roman law, the primary feature of which is that laws are written into a collection, codified, and not determined, as in common law, by judges.
It holds legislation as the primary source of law, and the court system is usually inquisitorial, unbound by precedent, and composed of specially-trained judicial officers.
The principle of civil law is to provide all citizens with an accessible and written collection of the laws which apply to them and which judges must follow.
It is the most prevalent and oldest surviving legal system in the world.
The primary source of law is the legal code, which is a compendium of statutes, arranged by subject matter in some pre-specified order; a code may also be described as "a systematic collection of interrelated articles written in a terse, staccato style."
Law codes are usually created by a legislature's enactment of a new statute that embodies all the old statutes relating to the subject and including changes necessitated by court decisions.
In some cases, the change results in a new statutory concept.

Civil Law Around the World
Because Germany was a rising power in the late 19th century and its legal system was well organized, when many Asian nations were developing, the German Civil Code became the basis for the legal systems of Japan and South Korea.

In China, the German Civil Code was introduced in the later years of the Qing Dynasty and formed the basis of the law of the Republic of China, which remains in force in Taiwan.

Some authors consider civil law to have served as the foundation for socialist law used in Communist countries, which in this view would basically be civil law with the addition of Marxist–Leninist ideas.

Even if this is so, civil law was generally the legal system in place before the rise of socialist law, and Eastern Europe reverted back to civil law following the fall of socialism.

Several legal insitutions in civil law were also adapted from similar institutions in Islamic law and jurisprudence during the Middle Ages. For example, the Islamic Hawala institution is the basis of the Avallo in Italian civil law and the Aval in French civil law.

Difference From Other Major Legal Systems of the World
Common Law
  • also called, Anglo-American, English & Judge made
  • source is case law & legislation
  • lawyers control the courtroom
  • judges must be experienced lawyers
  • there is a high degree of judicial independence
  • juries are provided at trial level
  • courts share in the balance of power over policy making.

Civil law

  • also called Continental & Romano-Germanic
  • source is statutes & legislation
  • judges dominate the court
  • use career judges
  • there is a high degree of judicial independence, separate from the Executive & Legislative branches of government
  • juries adjudicate in conjunction with judges in serious criminal matters
  • an equal but separate power in policy making
Socialist Law
  • also called communism
  • source is statutes & legisaltion
  • judges dominate trials
  • judges are career bureaucrats & party members
  • judicial independence is very limited
  • juries are often used at the lowest level
  • courts are subordinate to the legislature in policy making
  • found in countries like the Soviet Union
Islamic Law
  • also known as Religious Law
  • source is the Qur'un
  • lawyers play a secondary role
  • judges have religious and legal training
  • judicial independence is very limited
  • juries are not allowed
  • courts and other government branches are subordinate to Shari'a.

Maritime Law

History in England
Eleanor of Acquitane, acting as regent for her son, King Richard the Lionheart, during the Crusades, established Admiralty/Maritime law in England
In England, special admiralty courts handle all admiralty cases.
These courts do not use the common law of England, but are civil law courts largely based upon Roman Law.

Difference between Common Law & Maritime Law
Littered throughout Law is the concept of "reasonable belief" (when detaining people or property) which is based on admiralty law, the law of the sea where the captain of a ship only needed reason to believe that his ship was in danger by those under his command to order that certain things be done to protect it's commercial goods and goals.
Everything in admiralty works backwards from due process common law. A person being guilty before being proven innocent.
In Common Law, crimes can only occur if there is there has been physical damage to someone or to property, AND if there was intent to hurt someone.
Accidents and "negligence" are not crimes.
But we can be charged and sued for negligence.
Suing is a function of the corporate world.
No longer does there need to be an existing flesh and blood injured party anymore to file a criminal affidavit to initiate criminal proceedings, just the breaching of a statute, a de facto corporate statute (breaching the peace), a by-law or regulation, where the 'injured party' is the state, or corporate entity.

Commercial Contracts
Today in our law courts, all Commercial contracts that private parties enter into with each other that are under Maritime Jurisdiction, are now also under Admiralty: The reason is the beneficial use and re-circulation of Reserve Bank Notes makes the federal government an automatic silent third party to the arrangements.
Admiralty jurisdiction has in many respects, “come ashore”.
It currently affects almost every element of our inland commercial society.
In the USA, Admiralty jurisdiction rules are used to settle claims and grievances regarding cargo, international conventions, financing, banking, insurance, legislation, navigation, hazardous substances from nuclear power plants, stevedoring (the unloading of a vessel at a port), and undersea mining and development, the navigable rivers of the United States, as well as world-wide off-shore oil drilling activity.

Maritime Law on Land
The reason why Admiralty jurisdiction is of concern to us is because our government is using jurisdiction attachment rules applicable to an Admiralty jurisdictional environment to on-land-based citizens where Admiralty jurisdiction does not correctly belong.

The only ordinary land based people who should properly be under the government’s in personam Admiralty jurisdiction are government employees (federal and state), military service personnel, and those who specifically contract into Admiralty Jurisdiction (such as employees working for a Defense contractor with a security clearance, and private contractors hired by government to perform law enforcement related work).

Maritime / Admiralty Law in Australia
The Federal Court of Australia operates under Admiralty Law under the Blue Ensign.